Abstract. The conjugacy search problem in a group G is the problem of recovering an x ∈ G from given g ∈ G and h = x −1 gx. The alleged computational hardness of this problem in some groups was used in several recently suggested public key exchange protocols, including the one due to Anshel, Anshel, and Goldfeld, and the one due to Ko, Lee et al. Sibert, Dehornoy, and Girault used this problem in their authentication scheme, which was inspired by the Fiat-Shamir scheme involving repeating several times a three-pass challenge-response step. In this paper, we offer an authentication scheme whose security is based on the apparent hardness of the twisted conjugacy search problem which is: given a pair of endomorphisms (i.e., homomorphisms into itself) ϕ, ψ of a group G and a pair of elements w, t ∈ G, find an element s ∈ G such that t = ψ(s −1 )wϕ(s) provided at least one such s exists. This problem appears to be very non-trivial even for free groups. We offer here another platform, namely, the semigroup of all 2 × 2 matrices over truncated one-variable polynomials over F2, the field of two elements, with transposition used instead of inversion in the equality above.
Introduction
One of the most obvious ramifications of the discrete logarithm problem in the noncommutative situation is the conjugacy search problem:
Given a group G and two conjugate elements g, h ∈ G, find a particular element x ∈ G such that x −1 gx = h.
This problem always has a recursive solution because one can recursively enumerate all conjugates of a given element, but this kind of solution can be extremely inefficient. Specific groups may or may not admit more efficient solutions, so the choice of the platform group is of paramount importance for security of a cryptographic primitive based on the conjugacy search problem. A great deal of research was (and still is) concerned with the complexity of this problem in braid groups because there were several proposals, including the one ⋆ Research of the first author was partially supported by the NSF grant DMS-0405105.
by Anshel, Anshel, and Goldfeld [1] , and the one by Ko, Lee at al. [11] on using the alleged computational hardness of this problem in braid groups to build a key exchange protocol. Also, Sibert, Dehornoy, and Girault [15] used this problem in their authentication scheme, which was inspired by the Fiat-Shamir scheme involving repeating several times a three-pass challenge-response step. At the time of this writing, no deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for solving the conjugacy search problem in braid groups has been reported yet; see [3] and [4] for recent progress in this direction. However, several heuristic algorithms, in particular so-called "length based attacks", were shown to have very high success rates, see e.g. [7] , [8] , [10] , [12] , [13] . This shows that one has to be really careful when choosing the platform (semi)group to try to avoid length based or similar attacks. One way to achieve this goal is, informally speaking, to have "a lot of commutativity" inside otherwise non-commutative (semi)group; see [13] for a more detailed discussion.
In this paper, we propose an authentication scheme whose security is based on the apparent hardness of the (double) twisted conjugacy search problem which is:
given a pair of endomorphisms (i.e., homomorphisms into itself) ϕ, ψ of a group G and a pair of elements w, t ∈ G, find an element s ∈ G such that t = ψ(s −1 )wϕ(s) provided at least one such s exists.
This problem, to the best of our knowledge, has not been considered in group theory before, and neither was its decision version: given ϕ, ψ ∈ End(G), w, t ∈ G, find out whether or not there is an element s ∈ G such that t = ψ(s −1 )wϕ(s). However, the following special case of this problem (called the twisted conjugacy problem) has recently attracted a lot of interest among group theorists:
given ϕ ∈ End(G), w, t ∈ G, find out whether or not there is an element s ∈ G such that t = s −1 wϕ(s).
This problem is very non-trivial even for free groups; see [5] for an astonishing solution in the special case where ϕ is an automorphism of a free group. To the best of our knowledge, this decision problem is open for free groups if ϕ is an arbitrary endomorphism. Another class of groups where the twisted conjugacy problem was considered is the class of polycyclic-by-finite groups [16] . Again, the problem was solved for these groups in the special case where ϕ is an automorphism.
The conjugacy problem is a special case of the twisted conjugacy problem, where ϕ is the identity map. Now a natural question is: what is the advantage of the more general (double) twisted conjugacy search problem over the conjugacy search problem in the context of an authentication scheme? The answer is: if the platform (semi)group G has "a lot" of endomorphisms, then Alice (the prover), who selects ϕ, ψ, w, and s, has an opportunity to select them in such a way that there are a lot of cancelations between ψ(s), w, and ϕ(s), thus rendering length based attacks ineffective.
In this paper, we use the semigroup of all 2 × 2 matrices over truncated one-variable polynomials over F 2 , the field of two elements, as the platform. It may seem that the platform necessarily has to be a group since one should at least have the element s (see above) invertible. However, as we will see in the next section, we do not really need the invertibility to make our authentication protocol work; what we need is just some antihomomorphism of G into itself, i.e., a map * : G → G such that (ab) * = b * a * for any a, b ∈ G. Every group has such an antihomomorphism; it takes every element to its inverse. Every semigroup of square matrices has such an antihomomorphism, too; it takes every matrix to its transpose. Some (semi)groups have other special antihomomorphisms; for example, any free (semi)group has an antihomomorphism that rewrites every element "backwards", i.e., right-to-left. Here we prefer to focus on semigroups of matrices (over commutative rings) since we believe that these have several features making them fit to be platforms of various cryptographic protocols, see [14] for a more detailed discussion.
The protocol
In this section, we give a description of a single round of our authentication protocol. As with the original Fiat-Shamir scheme, this protocol has to be repeated k times if one wants to reduce the probability of successful forgery to
Here Alice is the prover and Bob the verifier. Let G be the platform semigroup, and * an antihomomorphism of G, i.e., (ab)
1. Alice's public key is a pair of endomorphisms ϕ, ψ of the group G and two elements w, t ∈ G, such that t = ψ(s * )wϕ(s), where s ∈ G is her private key. 2. To begin authentication, Alice selects an element r ∈ G and sends the element u = ψ(r * )tϕ(r), called the commitment, to Bob. 3. Bob chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice.
- Let us check now that everything works the way we want it to work.
3 The platform and parameters
Our suggested platform semigroup G is the semigroup of all 2 × 2 matrices over truncated one-variable polynomials over F 2 , the field of two elements. Truncated (more precisely, N -truncated) one-variable polynomials over F 2 are expressions of the form 0≤i≤N −1 a i x i , where a i are elements of F 2 , and x is a variable. In other words, N -truncated polynomials are elements of the factor algebra of the algebra F 2 [x] of one-variable polynomials over F 2 by the ideal generated by x N .
Our semigroup G has a lot of endomorphisms induced by endomorphisms of the algebra of truncated polynomials. In fact, any map of the form x → p(x), where p(x) is a truncated polynomial with zero constant term, can be extended to an endomorphism φ p of the algebra of truncated polynomials. Indeed, it is sufficient to show that φ p (x N ) = (p(x)) N belongs to the ideal generated by x N , which is obviously the case if p(x) has zero constant term. Then, since φ p is both an additive and a multiplicative homomorphism, it extends to an endomorphism of the semigroup of all 2 × 2 matrices over truncated one-variable polynomials in the natural way.
If we now let the antihomomorphism * from the description of the protocol in our Section 2 to be the matrix transposition, we have everything set up for an authentication scheme using the semigroup G as the platform.
Now we have to specify parameters involved in our scheme. The parameter N determines the size of the key space. If N is on the order of 300, then there are 2 300 polynomials of degree < N over F 2 , so there are 2 1200 2 × 2 matrices over N -truncated polynomials, i.e., the size of the private key space is 2 1200 , which is large enough.
At the same time, computations with (truncated) polynomials over F 2 are very efficient (see e.g. [2] , [6] , or [9] for details). In particular,
-Addition of two polynomials of degree N can be performed in O(N ) time.
-Multiplication of two polynomials of degree N can be performed in O (N log 2 N ) time.
-Computing composition p(q(x)) mod x N of two polynomial of degree N can be performed in O((N log 2 N ) Since those are the only operations used in our protocol, the time complexity of executing a single round of the protocol is O ((N log 2 N ) 3 2 ). The size of public key space is large, too. One public key is, again, a 2 × 2 matrix over N -truncated polynomials, and two other public keys are endomorphisms of the form x → p(x), where p(x) is an N -truncated polynomial with zero constant term. Thus, the number of different endomorphisms in this context is on the order of 2 300 , hence the number of different pairs of endomorphisms is on the order of 2 600 .
We also have to say a few words about how a private key s ∈ G is selected. We suggest that all entries of the matrix s have non-zero constant term; other coefficients of the entries can be selected randomly, i.e., "0" and "1" are selected with probability 1 2 each. Non-zero constant terms are useful here to ensure that there are sufficiently many non-zero terms in the final product t = ψ(s * )wϕ(s).
As we have pointed out in the previous section, the key space with suggested parameters is quite large, so that a "brute force" attack by exhausting the key space is not feasible. The next natural attack that comes to mind is attempting to solve a system of equations over F 2 that arises from equating coefficients at the same powers of x on both sides of the equation t = ψ(s * )wϕ(s). Recall that in this equation t, w, ϕ, and ψ are known, whereas s is unknown.
More specifically, our experiments emulating this attack were designed as follows. The entries of the private matrix s were generated as polynomials of degree N −1, with N = 100 (which is much smaller than the suggested N = 300), with randomly selected binary coefficients, except that the constant term in all polynomials was 1. Then, the endomorphisms ϕ and ψ were of the form x → p i (x), where p i (x) are polynomials of degree N − 1, with N = 150, with randomly selected binary coefficients, except that the constant term in both of them was 0. Finally, the entries of the public matrix w were generated, again, as polynomials of degree N − 1, with N = 100, with randomly selected binary coefficients, except that the constant term in all polynomials was 1.
The attack itself then proceeds as follows. The matrix equation t = ψ(s * )wϕ(s) is converted to a system of 4N polynomial equations (N for each entry of a 2 × 2 matrix) over F 2 . The unknowns in this system are coefficients of the polynomials of degree N − 1 that are the entries of the private matrix s. Then, starting with the constant term and going up, we equate coefficients at the same powers of x on both sides of each equation. After that, again starting with the coefficients at the constant term and going up, we find all possible solutions of each equation, one at a time. Thus we are getting a "tree" of solutions because some of the unknowns that occur in coefficients at lower powers of x also occur in coefficients at higher powers of x. If this tree does not grow too fast, then there is a chance that we can get all the way to the coefficients at highest power of x, thereby finding a solution of the system. This solution may not necessarily yield the same matrix s that was selected by Alice, but it is sufficient for forgery anyway.
We have run over 1000 experiments of this kind (which took about two weeks), allowing the solution tree to grow up to the width of 16384, i.e., allowing to go over at most 16384 solutions of each equation when proceeding to a higher power of x. Each experiment ran on a personal computer with Pentium 2Ghz dual core processor. The success rate of the described attack with these parameters was 0%.
Conclusions
We have introduced:
1. An authentication scheme based on the (double) twisted conjugacy problem, a new problem, which is allegedly hard in some (semi)groups.
2.
A new platform semigroup, namely the semigroup of all 2 × 2 matrices over truncated one-variable polynomials over F 2 . Computation in this semigroup is very efficient and, at the same time, the non-commutative structure of this semigroup provides for security at least against obvious attacks.
We point out here one important advantage of using the (double) twisted conjugacy problem over using a more "traditional" conjugacy search problem as far as (semi)groups of matrices are concerned. The conjugacy search problem admits a linear algebra attack upon rewriting the equation x −1 gx = h as gx = xh; the latter translates into a system of n 2 linear equations with n 2 unknowns, where n is the size of the matrices involved, and the unknowns are the entries of the matrix x. Of course, if the entries come not from a field but from a more general ring, such a system of linear equations does not necessarily admit a straightforward solution, but methods emulating standard techniques (like Gauss elimination) usually have a pretty good success rate anyway. For the twisted conjugacy problem, however, there is no reduction to a system of linear equations.
We have considered an attack based on reducing the twisted conjugacy problem to a system of polynomial equations over F 2 , but this attack becomes computationally infeasible even with a much smaller crucial parameter (which is the maximum degree of the polynomials involved) than the one we suggest in this paper.
